Covering the war against Ukraine from within Russia is not only dangerous for Western journalists, like the Wall Street Journal correspondent now under arrest. It is even worse for Russian nationals, where it is also a potentially fatal task, even from the comparative safety of the living room in Moscow.
So one well tried way of dealing with it is to do what was done in the Soviet era: discuss the lessons of the past, and by allusion shed light on the dilemmas of the present. The focus is on the deadlock over Bakhmut, where positional warfare echoing the First World War is raising all kinds of questions about how both sides can sustain this gruelling struggle.
One well known and provocative military historian in Russia, Alexander Shirokorad, perhaps best known for his coverage of the German invasion of 1941, has turned his attention to the trenches of the First World War, where a conflict which began as a highly mobile operation on the part of the aggressor ended up bogged down in positional warfare. And, as he points out, neither side then or now anticipated this outcome.
Amidst a broad ranging narrative emerges a key factor: morale. How did the war end, how was it that, even before then, armies in the field collapsed under the strain? Russia was an obvious example, following Austria-Hungary, of a state that failed Hegel’s supreme test of strength, and collapsed from within. Shirokorad writes: “The outcome of the First World War in 1917-18 was determined not by technology but the human factor: the revolutions in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary. I would point out that not one of these countries was knocked out of the war by force of arms.”
The author concludes: “I would like to hope that those for whom it is appropriate take into account all the risks of continuing a war of position into 2024 and beyond.”
Are you listening, Mr Putin?
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie:
30.03.2023 20:38:00
Позиционная война – ужас ХХ века
Почему политики не любят окопной правды
Through Russian Eyes 